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EARL HANCOCK ELLIS A Marine in Micronesia

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Lieutenant Colonel Earl Hancock Ellis (1880-1923) of the U.S Marine Corps ranks as one of the most enigmatic and legendary figures in 20th century American military history. In the fall of 1921, he embarked upon a confidential mission to the Pacific from which he never returned. After leaving the Yokohoma Naval Hospital on 6 October 1922, he became involved in spy activities, which ended with his death at Koror 12 May 1923.

Lieutenant Colonel Earl Hancock “Pete” Ellis (1880-1923) of the United States Marine Corps ranks as one of the most enigmatic and legendary figures in twentieth century American military history. His service in the Marine Corps spanned twenty-three years (1900-1923) during which time he served in the Far East and distinguished himself in France during World War I. From 1911 when he attended the Naval War College until 1921 when he submitted his famous and prophetic *Advanced Base Operations In Micronesia*, his brilliance as a war planner and strategist was established as unparalleled in the military services.

In the fall of 1921 he embarked upon a confidential mission to the Pacific from which he never returned. After leaving the Yokohoma Naval Hospital on 6 October 1922, he was not heard from until Japanese authorities in the Carolines reported him dead at Koror on 12 May 1923.

The events transpiring during the course of the mission and its subsequent investigation and retrieval of Ellis’ remains---a period of slightly more than two years---have ever since

been the subject of popular and official speculation and sensationalism. His death in Japanese territory at a time when he was unaccounted for by the Marine Corps, gave rise to contemporary press speculation that he was the victim of foul play by the Japanese. Although official investigations were undertaken immediately, the results were never sufficiently conclusive to lift the shroud of mystery, which surrounded his final days. The Japanese refused to cooperate in the investigation and kept their Micronesian islands veiled in secrecy.

What actually happened is not mysterious. Official records and statements by people who actually knew Ellis, or were involved somehow, have told part of the story. We now have readily available the testimonies of Micronesian eyewitnesses, some of whom lived and worked closely with Ellis while he was in the islands. In addition, there has also now been an examination of Ellis’ personal papers, which are in the possession of his family in Pratt, Kansas. The integration of these sources with the official information answers all-important questions, as well as many lesser ones, and allows for a

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straightforward objective account of Ellis' Micronesian mission. They also tell of a curious, interesting, and tragic human drama.

ELLIS THE MAN AND MARINE

Ellis began his career in the Marines when he enlisted at Chicago in 1900. In 1901, Ellis was commissioned a second lieutenant and began his rise through the officer ranks. By the end of his first decade of military service, Ellis was firmly committed to the development of offensive advanced base operations as the fundamental mission of the Marine Corps.[2] From 1911 to 1913, Ellis attended the Naval War College at Newport, Rhode Island,[3] where he prepared and delivered a number of papers relating to the strategic importance of naval bases.[4] Then while serving on Guam in 1915, he and a small group of men took a three inch gun across the reef at Orote Point, thus demonstrating for the first time that artillery could be landed from boats.[5] From 1915 until America's entry into World War I, Ellis served in Washington, D.C., Philadelphia, and Quantico. Ellis distinguished himself in France during World War I by planning and helping to execute a difficult operation along Mont Blanc Ridge on the Hindenburg Line. For this, he was decorated with the Croix de Guerre and the Navy Cross.[6]

After the war, he was assigned to the newly-created Operations and Training Division at Washington headquarters by the commandant, major General John Archer Lejeune.[7] There after seven months, he completed his remarkable *Operations Plan 712-H: Advanced base Operations in Micronesia*,[8] Ellis was in his forty-first year. His professional; military record showed him to be a high-achiever and an indefatigable worker, completely dedicated to his service. Contemporaries referred to him as "one of the most brilliant officers in the Marine Corps." [9]

But, there was a darker personal side. Throughout his adult life, Ellis suffered from nervous disorders and depression. He began drinking after joining the Marines, and by the time he was a captain, he had a serious alcohol problem. On Guam in 1915, his medical record shows for the first time he was hospitalized for this difficulty.[10] After this his record is spot-

ted with a series of treatments and recuperations. These depressions and drinking bouts were sometimes accompanied by bizarre behavior. One incident in the Philippines has him "shooting plates off a dinner table" following a meal. In another at Saipan during his Guam tour, he reportedly "knocked a Japanese down a flight of stairs" with little provocation.[11] Diagnoses were entered for him as "neurasthenia" or psychosthenia" used at the time to describe depressions, phobias, nervous uncertainties, and the other irrationalities.

Graphologists analyzing Ellis' handwriting at different stages in his life have also called attention to evidences of confusion and disturbance. At age nineteen, before joining the Marines, he was noted from a handwriting specimen as "fighting an inner battle with himself." [12] Possibly his motivation for joining the Marines had something to do with trying to resolve his inner conflicts and feelings if inadequacy.[13] Doubting his ability and constantly seeking recognition, he always strove to excel.[14] But from 1915 onward, his drinking problem became steadily more serious, and he was hospitalized on numerous occasions for extended periods.

The Marine office corps was something of a fraternity in Ellis' day. It was enough that most of the men knew each other personally. Alcoholism was not then recognized as the serious disease it is. Those with problems were helped along or covered-up by others. Undoubtedly this was the case with Ellis. General Lejeune, a close friend of Ellis', was certainly aware of his alcoholism but, nevertheless, retained him and allowed him the satisfaction of exercising his talent for strategic planning. It must nevertheless be assumed that while there was compassion for Ellis, there was also frustration and consternation in the Corps. Ellis' behavior pattern, as exhibited by his medical record was to go through a series of increasingly severe binges and depressions always to emerge apparently recovered, and hence to obtain a reprieve, with encouragement from his superiors to abstain and reform.

PLANNING THE MISSION

His final mission had the aspect of a last chance. His health had deteriorated by the time he joined the headquarters staff, and the intense devotion to his task absorbed and enervated him.[15] His paper *Advanced Base Operations in Micronesia*, recognized even then as an outstanding work, brought him relief and a sense of accomplishment. It is understandable that having outlined the plans for an advance base campaign against the Japanese, he would want to travel personally to the mandated islands to reconnoiter, evaluate, and refine his work. The idea was not new. He had first requested such travel as early as 1912 while at the War College and while Micronesia was still under German control.

After World War I, while Ellis was assigned to headquarters, the matter was renewed. International events provided a sound rationale for the mission. The Japanese took Micronesia from the Germans at the outbreak of World War I.[16] This gave them a Pacific dominance and enabled them to limit U.S. access to the Philippines. When the war ended Micronesia was awarded to Japan by the Treaty of Versailles. America acceptance of the Japanese claim was contingent upon Japan joining the League of Nations and governing the islands by a mandate which prohibited fortifications. The Japanese agreed and instituted a civil government, but denied foreigner's access to Micronesia. This prompted rumors that the islands were being fortified. In the 1920s, intelligence information could be gathered only by getting people on the ground to observe. Thus, General Lejeune became involved in queries to ONI regarding such a mission and the assignment of Ellis to it.[17] Undoubtedly Lejeune had serious reservations about allowing Ellis to go and the two men must have had some candid discussions about the mission and Ellis' physical and psychological ability to undertake it. In the end, Lejeune apparently decide to let Ellis accomplish the mission by taking extended leave, thus avoiding the necessity of getting official approval. Going further, Ellis provided the commandant with a signed, undated letter of resignation to save the Marine

Corps embarrassment should it become necessary.[18]

Ellis prepared himself for the mission by first arranging for his pay to be deposited directly in his bank account. As a ruse for the trip he arranged cover as a traveling agent buying copra for the John A. Hughes Trading Company of 2 Rectos Street, New York City.[19] Ellis also procured maps, charts, navigation, and confidential codebooks to take on his journey.[20] All these preparations were made presumably without the ONI having any direct or official knowledge.[21]

ELLIS THE SPY ON HIS MISSION

Ellis left on his final mission in August 1921. After departing San Francisco aboard the *SS Maheno*, Ellis visited Australia, Samoa, and possibly Fiji. He returned to Australia where he obtained a visa to enter the Japanese mandates,[22] From there he went to Manila and then on to Japan. At every stop, with the exception of Samoa and Fiji, he became ill and was hospitalized.[23] Nevertheless, he pushed on toward Japan after cabling Washington on his whereabouts.[24]

In late July 1922, Ellis sailed the *SS President Jackson* from Manila to Yokohoma where he stayed at the Grand Hotel. Soon after his arrival, he once again became ill. The Japanese hotel manager summoned Commander Ulys R. Webb, USN, commanding officer of the U.S. Naval Hospital in Yokohoma who came to see Ellis and, diagnosing alcoholism, had him admitted to the hospital immediately.[25] Ellis confided to Dr. Webb that he was on a secret mission.[26] For the next two months Ellis was in and out of the hospital several times. On 12 September 1922, he was again admitted with "delirium tremens and hallucinations." [27] Dr. Webb then assigned Chief Pharmacist Lawrence Zembsch to watch over him constantly and consulted privately with the American naval attaché at the U.S. Embassy, Captain Lyman A. Cotton, USN. Cotton and Webb arranged to have Ellis sent home,[28] and gave him his choice of leaving either by commercial liner or government transport.

This development alarmed Ellis and forced him to make what must have been a very diffi-

cult decision. If he returned home, it would have been in disgrace and failure both in accomplishing the mission and in disappointing general Lejeune, who had confidence in him. Probably he would have faced early retirement. If he proceeded with the mission he would be defying orders, but he could gain some vindication if he were ultimately successful. Perhaps too, Ellis now realized that he would soon die from his illness and concluded that he had set out. Thus, he determined to go. On 4 October 1922, he wired his bank for money, and two days later left the hospital, removing himself at last from all military authority.

Ellis probably sailed from Kobe aboard the *Kasuga Maru* of the Nanyo Boeki Kaisha (NBK) Kines. He got off at Saipan where Spanish Jesuit missionary, Brother Gregorio, resident there at that time, remembered him. Ellis' next stop was Yap; sometime in November. There he visited briefly with a half-caste Marshallese-German businessman named Henry Fleming. Fleming, who has been educated in Germany and learned a little English there, remembered that Ellis arrived aboard the *Matsuyama Maru*, staying for only a short time because the ship was sailing on to Palau that evening, but displaying during his brief tour an impressive knowledge of the copra trade.[29] When the ship arrived at Koreorm Oilasong Tellei, chief of the native police, checked his papers at the dock and noticed Ellis was listed as going to Jaluit. Again, Ellis' visit was brief, only a couple of days. He stayed at a Japanese hotel in Koror.[30]

No one at Truk or Pohnpei recalled Ellis, but at Kusaie he was remembered by an American resident, Victor J. Herman.[31] The ship proceeded to Jaluit, and enroute Ellis became very ill. On Sunday, 31 December 1922, Jesse Rebecca Hoppin, an American Protestant missionary was awakened at 2:00 am by police chief Tanaka Shoji. Together with the resident medical doctor, Ishoda Uichi, they went aboard the *Matsuyama Maru* to bring Ellis, "whose life was in danger" to the hospital.[32] After two weeks he was released and moved to the mission compound as the guest of Jesse Hoppin. The Japanese authorities watched Ellis closely, but cautiously. They had identified "mother

Hoppin"—as the Marshalese affectionately called her—as the best person to attend him. Undoubtedly Ellis told her of his mission, although in no way was she a collaborator. She provided separate lodgings for Ellis on the compound, and arranged that various school children should do chores for him. One of these, Benjamin Lajipun, became his houseboy and together they toured Jaluit on foot and by canoe, all the while tailed by the Japanese. Periodically, the small sailing ship, *Caroline Maru*, made fieldtrips through the Marshall to collect copra and deliver supplies, and Ellis joined the mission party on one of these to the Ratak Chain. He took copious notes. Next the *Caroline Maru* was scheduled for the Ralik Chain, but this time the Japanese attempted to prevent Ellis' passage. He finally prevailed, but they sent Dr. Ishoda to watch him. Ellis slept on the deck and at each island charted the reefs and inventoried facilities, local products, and local populations.

Following this trip, Japanese surveillance was increased, and Ellis took even greater precautions. But he could not refrain from spirits, which he kept hidden in his quarters, and he occasionally became sick. Mother Hoppin scolded him and admonished the local shopkeepers not to sell Ellis whiskey. But he got liquor anyway and drank continuously.

Returning to Kusaie on his trip back through the mandates in mid-March 1923, Ellis stayed at the home of J.V. Millander, a naturalized American of Swedish birth who owned a trading company. The company foreman was Millander's nephew, Arthur Hermann, whose brother, Victor, had met Ellis on his first brief stop there three months earlier.[33] Victor Hermann accompanied Ellis on the trip to Pohnpei, beginning the first leg of his journey back to America. They became friendly on the trip and, upon reaching Palau, enjoyed a few drinks together at the hotel before the ship left. When they parted, Ellis gave Herman an address and stamped envelope and asked him to mail it in San Francisco. He told Hermann "he would stay on Palau for a while and then go southward to Menado" in the Celebes.[34]

At Palau, Ellis decided not to stay in the Japanese hotel, but instead moved in with high

clan Palauans who had befriended him. These Palauans also provided Ellis with a wife, Metauie, a beautiful woman some twenty-five years his junior.[35] Oikasong Tellei, chief of the native police force, was one of four assigned to watch Ellis closely. Ellis covered all of Koror, the harbor at Malakal and adjoining Arakabesang Island, but was not permitted to travel to Babelthuap, Peleliu, or Angaur. Tellei recalled that Ellis sought out the high places and "looked out over the sea." [36] In the evenings Ellis would seattle down in his Palauan house and invariably begin drinking. The house, a small, thatched affair, was not far from the NBK store where beer and whiskey could be obtained. Ellis had his houseboys, Felix Rechuld and Antonio Ngirakelau, get the liquor for him by special arrangement with the store manager.[37] As he became sicker and his delirium tremens increases, the Japanese sent Dr. Isake Isoroku to attend him. Ellis sent him away several times. In spite of urgings from Palauans and Japanese, he continued to consume large quantities of beer and sake.[38] Occasionally, he would rant and rave, and once he pranced around the house "like a soldier and punched his arm through the wall." [39]

Metauie remembered clearly the day of his death. He had been violently ill for several days previous and was attended constantly by herself, William Gibbons, his wife Ngerdoko, and the houseboys. Ellis cried, she recalled, and talked incoherently sometimes about his home and family in America. At one point, he confided to them that he "was an American spy sent by higher authority from New York." [40] Dr. Isake came one last time to persuade him to stop drinking and offered medication, which Ellis refused. By mid-afternoon on 12 May 1923, he was dead.

One can only speculate as to the sequence of events which immediately followed Ellis' death. The Palauans, led by the high chief saw Ellis' burial nearby. More than a week passed before the authorities notified the America Embassy in Tokyo, [41] His belongings, among his various maps, charts, notes and confidential codebook, were confiscated by the Japanese. The Japanese governor may have prepared a

full report, but no record of this has ever been found. [42] They undoubtedly were relieved to get his notes and charts.

After the story broke in America, and over the years since, there have been suggestions and implications that Ellis poisoned by the Japanese. There is absolutely no evidence for this. Every effort was made to offer him medical assistance. He always refused and was usually impolite about it. As far as is known, he was never medicated. That the Japanese would have placed poison in his whiskey is unlikely since, for Ellis whiskey itself was poison enough. Clearly, his own stubbornness and self-destructive tendencies killed him in the end.

Back in Washington, the news of Ellis' death was received with shock and suspicion. Since the mandates were strictly closed to outsiders, throughout the Asiatic Fleet there was inclination to believe stories of Japanese duplicity rife in the Americas press. Lejeune was saddened. His letters to Ellis' family were compassionate, and he saw to it that they were not burdened with debts. [43] With Ellis dead and the mission lost, he saw no need for the undated letter of resignation. Back in California ONI investigators interrogated Victor Hermann, but he knew nothing about Ellis' death, and after a couple of weeks the matter faded from public view. [44]

In Tokyo, Captain Cotton attempted to arrange for an American ship to call at Palau to retrieve Ellis' remains. [45] The Japanese refused this request but assented to an individual representative going to Koror as their guest to bring back the body. Cotton saw a chance to gather some intelligence but lacked trained agents. He finally settled on Lawrence Zembsch for the mission. Zembsch, a chief pharmacist, was a seventeen-year veteran and had attended Ellis at the Yokohama Naval Hospital. After a briefing on the seriousness of his mission and the possibility of danger, Zembsch departed for Palau by Japanese steamer on 5 July 1923. [46]

At Koror Zembsch stayed at the Japanese barracks. He was introduced to all those who knew Ellis and was escorted by Oikasong Tellei. At the burial site the remains were ex-

humed, photographed, and cremated. William Gibbons told Zembsch that Ellis was suspected by the Japanese of spying, and that they had watched him closely. The chief pharmacist offered to pay any debts Ellis had left, but the Japanese would not permit this.[47] Zembsch left Palau with Ellis's ashes and a little more information that he had when he arrived.

But when Zembsch arrived at Yokohama on August 14, 1923, he had to be carried from his cabin and taken immediately to the hospital. The strain of the trip had apparently caused Zembsch to have a nervous breakdown. He was recovering nicely when, at approximately noon on 1 September 1923, the great Kanto earthquake completely destroyed the hospital burying him "beneath the falling debris beyond the possibility of rescue." [48] The mission of Zembsch then, only served to spin a tighter web of mystery around the mission of Ellis. More questions were raised than answered. And the unanswered questions about Ellis remained. Nor had Zembsch provided any intelligence about Japanese activities in the mandates. In retrospect, history has little to show for Ellis' mission. Nothing was discovered that was not already known. The notes, charts, and maps made on the trip were lost.

Ellis himself would have found no fortifications as early as 1923, only rumor and gossip. He was interested in making onsite inspections of the islands he had designated in his *Advanced Base Operations in Micronesia* as being critical to an island hopping campaign, in order that he could improve upon his plans. Had he survived, such information would have been very useful.

CRITIQUE OF THE MISSION

Shedding light on the details of Ellis' Micronesian mission in no way detracts from his efforts in the cause on his work. As a spy he does not receive high marks. From a military standpoint only the most dismal appraisal could be made of his mission's execution: a seriously ill, neurotic, sometimes drunken Marine officer, AWOL, with a code book, openly discussing his mission with American nationals and, in full view of the Japanese, traipsing through the islands making notes and maps. American naval

authorities would have been embarrassed had they known of Ellis's whereabouts.[49]

The Japanese must have also been embarrassed. They had not yet fortified their islands,[50] and must have wondered what Ellis was looking for. Surely, they were alarmed at his advanced state of ill health because at every location they provided his access to medical assistance, all of which he refused or avoided as soon as he was able to remove himself from their hospitals. That the Americans would send such a person to spy must have seemed to them incredulous, even ludicrous. Considering their restrained behavior and tolerance, they were probably hoping they could get him out of the mandates before he died. A more sinister but less plausible interpretation is that they saw he was self-destructive and that it was only a matter of time before he drank himself to death.

But Ellis's belief in, and commitment to, his cause is undeniable and borne-out, albeit tragically, by his experience. His inability to conquer his alcoholism was pathetic, but he doggedly moved ahead in the face of what he must have known to be impending personal doom.

CONCLUSION

Ellis's war prophecies have outlived the mystery of his mission. Although he was no means alone in recognizing that the balance of power in the Pacific had shifted with Japan's acquisition of Micronesia, his unique contribution was that he knew what the Marine Corps should do about the threat, and he acted on that belief.

The military genius of Earl Hancock Ellis is clear and his contributions are permanent.

ENDNOTES

- [1] Some eight primary sources were used in the preparation of this article. Article originally entitled "Earl Ellis: A Marine's Multiple Muff-UPS in Mufti in Micronesia."
- [2] On 6 October 1900, the newly informed General Board of the Navy recommended to Secretary John D. Long, that the Marine Corps be assigned the advanced base mission, and on 22 November the Commandant, Brigadier General Charles Heywood, concurred. The development of this doctrine took place gradually over many years. As early as 1890 Admiral Al-

- fred T. Mahan, then a captain, said that the Marines “will constitute a backbone to any landing force on the enemy’s coast.” D.W. Mitchell, *History of the Modern Navy From 1883 Through Pearl Harbor*, New York, 1946; R. Seager, II, and D. D. Maguire, *The Letters and Papers of Alfred Thayer Mahan*, vol. 3, Annapolis, 1975; see also, P.F. Pierce and F. Hough, *The Compact History of the U.S. Marines Corps*, New York, 1960.
- [3] Ellis was enrolled for the “short course” at the War College in 1911. Outstanding in his studies, the president of the college requested that he remain for the “long course” the following term. After completing that course, he became a faculty member for a time. Also, during this period Ellis requested “duty in making personal reconnaissances of ports in the Atlantic and Pacific likely to be occupied as advanced bases in times of war.” *Ellis File*; also, John J. Reber, “Pete Ellis; Amphibious Warfare Prophet,” U.S. Naval Institute *Proceedings*, November 1977.
- [4] Earl H. Ellis, USMC, “Naval Bases, Their Location, Resources and Security”, “The Denial of Bases”, “The Security of Advanced Bases and Advanced Base Operations”, and “Advanced Base Force,” U>S. Naval War College, *Archives*, RG-8, Intelligence and Technical archives, 1894-1946. One of Ellis’s “problem papers” at the war college dealt with defense of Guam, and it is not surprising that he was soon afterwards sent there to prepare an official report.
- [5] Earl H. Ellis, USMC, “Report of a Military Reconnaissance of the Island of Guam, 1914-1915,” *National Archives*, RG-38; copy at the Micronesian Area Research Center, University of Guam.
- [6] Ellis World War One decorations were “the Croix de Guerre and Palm and the Legion of Honor, grade of Chevalier. He was also awarded the Navy Cross...for excellence in his staff duties.” Reber, *Ibid*.
- [7] Admiral Sims, presidents of the War College, wanted Ellis assigned there in 1920, but instead Lejuene brought him to Washington to work in his new division. An excellent account of Lejuene’s reorganization of Marine Headquarters is given in Robert D. Heine, Jr., *Soldiers of the Sea; U.S. Marine Corps, 1775-1962*, Annapolis, 1962.
- [8] This is a monumental theoretical work in military strategy from which all subsequent wars plans and later operations against the Japanese emanated. Its description and significance are aptly treated elsewhere. See; Reber, Pierce, *Ibid.*, and also J. Robert Moskin, *The U.S. Marine Corps Story*, New York, 1977.
- [9] Personal testimony of General Julian C. Smith, USMC (ret.), *Ellis Collection*, MARC, University of Guam.
- [10] Ellis Medical Record, 6 March 1915.
- [11] Reber, *Ibid*.
- [12] Virginia L. Fowler, “Graphical Report on Earl Ellis,” 24 February 1972, *Ellis Collection*, MARC, University of Guam.
- [13] This is speculation. Ellis was the “blacksheep” of his immediate family, and the first to leave home.
- [14] Fowler, *Ibid*.
- [15] From September 1916 to August 1921, Ellis had taken or lost to illness 282 days to leave. Also, by this time his alcoholism had affected his permanently and he suffered continually from nephritis which is an inflammation of the kidneys. *Ellis Medical Record*.
- [16] The Japanese had signed an alliance with the British as early as 1905 for the maintenance of the general peace in Asia. Under these terms the British asked Japan to chase the German fleet out of the Pacific should the war break out in Europe. Japan accomplished this, and seized all the Germans lands north of the equator during three weeks in October 1914. B. Collier, *The Story of the Great War*, vol.3, New York, 1916.
- [17] In 1912 Ellis requested “duty in making personal reconnaissances of ports... likely to be occupied as advanced bases time in war.” On 30 June 1920, Ellis wrote confidentially to Lejuene requesting that he be allowed to go to the Pacific to “make the necessary reconnaissance.” Lejuene forwarded the letter to the Director of Naval Intelligence to see if they were interested. They were, and replied on 4 September that their needs for intelligence were “somewhat different that the Army requirements.” The matter of whether or not Ellis was the man they wanted to send was “taken up as a separate issue” and not included in ONI’s reply. *Ellis File*.
- [18] There are no notations in Ellis’s file officially assigning him to such a mission. On 9 April 1921, he did request leave to go to Europe. Lejuene forwarded this to the acting Secretary of the Navy, who approved it and returned it the next day. Before leaving on his mission, Ellis reportedly gave Lejuene an undated letter

- of resignation from the Marine Corps “so as not to embarrass the Corps,” *Ellis File*.
- [19] Ellis was a good friend of John D. Hughes, a fellow officer. His father, John A. Hughes, was the owner of the company. The arrangement for using this company as cover for the mission was readily and easily made. Personal testimony, General Gerald Thomas. *Ellis Collection*, MARC, University of Guam.
- [20] The fact that Ellis carried a confidential code book on his mission was something that was not publicly known for more than 50 years after his death. Among his personal papers held by his family in Pratt, Kansas, was found a piece of Army-Navy Club stationery with encoded writing on it. Investigation revealed that it was as F-1 Naval Code. It was authorized for use by the Navy after 21 May 1918, and had been printed in 1912 by the Press Publishing Company of New York as the “Universal Pocket Code.” It was originally designed for “detectives, commercial houses, and other person who required an efficient means of communication by telegraph or cable with their home offices.” Correspondence. Naval Security Group Command, 16 April 1971, *Ellis Collection* MARC, University of Guam.
- [21] Intelligence gathering was the exclusive domain of the Navy. The Marine Corps had absolutely no authority in this area. General Thomas testimony. *Ellis Collection*, MARC, University of Guam.
- [22] Correspondence from the American Consul, Sydney, Australia, to the U.S. Secretary of State, 6 December 1921; and from Japanese Consul-General at Sydney, Australia, to the Japanese Foreign Ministry, 30 November 1921. *National Archives*, RG-80.
- [23] Hospitalization in Fiji and Samoa is not certain. In Sydney, Australia, he was hospitalized at the Wooten Private Hospital. A Mrs. Dorothy Hepburn nursed him there and corresponded with his family after his death. *Ellis Personal Papers*.
- [24] Ellis cabled Col. Robert H. Dunlap from Sydney, Australia; “Impractical here proceeding Japan (*sic*)...” *Ellis File*.
- [25] E.M. Zacharias, *Secret Missions*, New York, 1946, pp.44ff.
- [26] “He told me he was on a highly confidential mission under verbal orders of the Secretary of the Navy, 7 October 1922. *Ellis File*.
- [27] Ellis Medical Record, 12 September 1922.
- [28] Ordering Ellis home under the circumstances was not simple and involved the procedure of certifying him sick. Cotton had not been informed of the nature of Ellis’s mission, and had interfered, he could have been in serious trouble. Dr. Webb, by declaring him sick, would provide the necessary rationale. This he accomplished on or about 1 October 1922, and communicated it to General Lejeune. Upon receipt of Webb’s report, Lejeune revoked Ellis’s leave and ordered him home on 16 October 1922. *Ellis File*.
- [29] Personal Testimony. Henry Fleming. *Ellis Collection*, MARC, University of Guam.
- [30] Personal Testimony. Joseph Oikasong Tellei. *Ibid*.
- [31] Personal Testimony. Victor J. Herman, *Ibid*.
- [32] Correspondence, Hoppin to Tanaka, 24 July 1924, *ABCFM Archives*, Houghton Library, Cambridge, Massachusetts.
- [33] Victor J. Herman, *Ibid*.
- [34] Victor J. Herman, *Ibid*.
- [35] Personal Testimony. Metauie. *Ellis Collection*, MARC, University of Guam.
- [36] Joseph Oikasong Tellei, *Ibid*.
- [37] Palauans were not permitted to buy spirits of any kinds. Testimony of Felix Rechuid, *Ellis Collection*, MARC, University of Guam.
- [38] Personal Testimony. Ngerdoko Gibbons. *Ibid*.
- [39] Personal Testimony. Antonio Ngirakelau. *Ibid*
- [40] Metauie, *Ibid*.
- [41] Ellis’s death was reported to the State Department on 21 May 1923, some ten days later. *Ellis File*.
- [42] In 1949, General Douglas MacArthur, on request from the Marine Corps, ordered a search of Japanese files, but nothing was turned up. Correspondence. General Clifton Cates, USMC, Commandant Naval Forces Far East, 3 August 1949. *Ellis File*.
- [43] Lejeune had Ellis kept in pay status from 5 May 1921, to 20 September 1922, in order to provide his family with sufficient funds to pay debts on his account amounting to over \$1500. Correspondence. MGC Confidential Letter to the Paymaster, USMC, 11 September 1923. *Ellis File*.
- [44] Victor J. Herman, *Ibid*.
- [45] The new *USS Milwaukee*, a cruiser, was sent 22 September 1923, to the Pacific from Hawaii. It did pay on a call at Truk on 28 September 1923, but this had nothing to do directly with Ellis affair.
- [46] Commander Webb’s report. *Ellis File*.
- [47] Oikasong Tellei. *Ibid*.
- [48] Zembsch Medical File, 14 August 1923.

- [49] After 6 October 1922, nothing of Ellis whereabouts were known by the U.S. military authorities. On 30 December 1925, Cotton sent a telegram to Washington saying; “since the even of 6 October there has been no trace of LT. Col.Ellis.” *Ellis File*.
- [50] Investigation following World War II established that no fortifications were begun until after 1935; most were made after 1941. Thomas Wild, “ How Japan Fortified the Mandates,” U.S. Naval Institute *Proceedings*, 1955.

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