Footnotes


[1]   Robson 1945:40; Freeman 1951:362. [back]

[2]    Drummond-Hay 1939; Ayers 1940 [back]

[3]   United States, Congress, 1939, An act to authorise the Secretary of the Navy to proceed with the construction of certain public works, and for other purposes. April 25, 1939. House Resolution 4278. In: United States Statutes at large containing the laws and concurrent resolutions enacted during the first session of the seventy-sixth congress of the United Atates of America 1939 treaties, international agreements other than treaties, proclamations, and reorganisation plans compiled, edited, indexed, and published by authority or law under the direction of the Secretary of State Volume 53 Part 1 Public laws and reorganization plans. Washington: United States Government Printing Office Pp. 590-592. [back]

[4]   A few days earlier a squadron of 12 PBY Catalinas had arrived as a protective screen for the task group centred on U.S.S. Enterprise (Cunningham 1961:47). The planes left after the fighters had been delivered. The squadron of Catalinas also took the last aerial photos of Wake Atoll before the Japanese attack (Wake Island. Aerial photo mosaic made by patrol wing two, Photographic and reconnaissance Unit, 0900 December 3, 1941.Scale 1:10,812. U.S.National Archives, Washington. Record Group 80G, Negative No. 418894). [back]

[5]   Cunningham 1961:43. [back]

[6]   Cunningham 1961:31. [back]

[7]   Delivered by U.S.S.Enterprise on 4 December 1941 (Sherrod 1952:35). [back]

[8]   The exact figure of the civilian contractors is unknown and the estimates avdanced vary widely. A figure between 1,100 and 1,200 is most likely (Cunningham 1961; Junghans n.d.; Hough et al. 1958). [back]

[9]   Compiled after Sherrod 1952:37; Cohen 1983; The figures published are conflicting. [back]

[10]   A crew member of the Triton had been transferred ashore for medical treatment (Cunningham 1961:44). [back]

[11]   Including at least two Chamorros. [back]

[12]   The passengers arrived on the Guam-bound clipper on the eve of the Pearl Harbor attack and left on the morning of the attack. The plane was recalled and ordered to fly a reconnaissance mission, after which it returned to Midway and then Pearl Harbor (Cunningham 1961:57-59). [back]

[13]   Cunningham 1961:30. [back]

[14]   Battery A consisted of 5" coastal defense guns, while battery E consisted of 3" anti-aircraft guns. Battery E was the centre of attention of Japanese bombing raids and shifted its position three times over the period of the defense of Wake, but always remained in the general vicinity of the southeastern part of the atoll (see map in Cunningham 1961; Hough et al. 1958). [back]

[15]   Dierdorff 1943 [back]

[6]   As it is not visible on aerial photos dated 25 May 1941, USNA RG 80G-451196 [back]

[17]   USNA RG 80G-418894 [back]

[18]   The island commander of Wake, Commander W.S.Cunningham mentions in his memoirs that the U.S. Navy by radio messages from Pearl Harbor urged the completion of the channel even in the face of an attempted Japanese landing and continuous Japanese bombing raids on Wake (Cunningham 1961: 39; 104; 114).

The dredging of the channel continued under Japanese supervision using the U.S. civilian prisoners of war. It finally came to a halt when the dredge Columbia was hit in Wake lagoon by naval gunfire from the cruisers U.S.S.Northampton and U.S.S. Salt Lake City during the U.S. carrier raid of 24 February 1942 (Junghans n.d.:19). [back]

[19]   Marshallese and Japanese date. [back]

[20]   In addition, the midget submarines attacking shipping during the raid in 7 December 1941 were launched from the submarine , which was based in Kwajalein (Hashimoto 1954:31-32). [back]

[21]   The attack on Wake has been written up and reported by a large number of published sources. Consequently I refrain from providing a blow-by-blow account. The reader seeking more detail than presented here is referred to the following sources: Sherrod 1952; Devereux 1947; Cunningham 1961; Heinl 1954; Hough et al. 1958. [back]

[22]   One of which could be repaired (Sherrod 1952:38). [back]

[23]   Hough et al. 1958:122. [back]

[24]   Hough et al. 1958:96. [back]

[25]   Hough et al. 1958:116. [back]

[6]   Local date, not Pearl Harbor date.Compiled from Hough et al. 1958; Sherrod 52; Cunningham 1961; Devereux 1947; Heinl 1947; Morison 1952. [back]

[27]   On old converted destroyer [back]

[28]   This sinking has never been fully confirmed by Japanese sources (cf. Sherrod 1952:41; but see claim in Cunningham 1961:96). According to Japanese reports (quoted in Hough et al. 1958:122) two Japanese submarines, RO-62 and RO-66 were lost on 17 December 1941 about 25 mines southwest of Wake. While one submarine, RO-66, seems to have sunk due mechanical problems, the other, RO-62, may have been the victim of the bombing raid.

For the history of the individual naval vessels involved in the attacks on Wake the reader is referred to a comprhensive volume on the warships of the Imperial Japanese Navy by Jentschura et al. (1977). Comparatively little is known, however, about the naval transports, all requisitioned merchant vessels. We know about the S.S. Tenyo Maru, a 80t vessel which since the mid-1920s had been a copra trading vessel in the Marshalls and Carolines on behalf of the Japanese trading company Nan'yo Boeki Kaisha (NBK). (It is reported at anchor in Jaluit in August 1926: B.P.Dicker, Captain 15th Punjab Regiment, Indian Army, Report on a trip to Japanese Mandated Islands in Nippon Yusen Kaisha S.S.Kasuga Maru, 20 August to 12 October 1926. Report contained in Commonwealth of Australia, External Affairs Department, Australian Archives, Record No. A981/3. Marshall and Caroline Islands 3 Part 1. Australian Archives, This sinking has never been fully confirmed by Japanese sources (cf. Sherrod 1952:41; but see claim in Cunningham 1961:96). According to Japanese reports (quoted in Hough et al. 1958:122) two Japanese submarines, RO-62 and RO-66 were lost on 17 December 1941 about 25 mines southwest of Wake. While one submarine, RO-66, seems to have sunk due mechanical problems, the other, RO-62, may have been the victim of the bombing raid.

For the history of the individual naval vessels involved in the attacks on Wake the reader is referred to a comprhensive volume on the warships of the Imperial Japanese Navy by Jentschura et al. (1977). Comparatively little is known, however, about the naval transports, all requisitioned merchant vessels. We know about the S.S. Tenyo Maru, a 80t vessel which since the mid-1920s had been a copra trading vessel in the Marshalls and Carolines on behalf of the Japanese trading company Nan'yo Boeki Kaisha (NBK). (It is reported at anchor in Jaluit in August 1926: B.P.Dicker, Captain 15th Punjab Regiment, Indian Army, Report on a trip to Japanese Mandated Islands in Nippon Yusen Kaisha S.S.Kasuga Maru, 20 August to 12 October 1926. Report contained in Commonwealth of Australia, External Affairs Department, Australian Archives, Record No. A981/3. Marshall and Caroline Islands 3 Part 1. Australian Archives, [back]

[29]   The task force was centered on the aircraft carrier U.S.S. Saratoga. with three cruisers of the Cruiser Division 6 (U.S.S. Astoria, U.S.S. Minneapolis and U.S.S. San Francisco) and nine destroyers of the Destroyer Squadron 4. In addition, the sea-plane tender/transport U.S.S. Tangier, carrying a reinforcement marine detachment, r and the fleet oiler U.S.S. Neches were involved. Dates given are Wake Island dates. [back]

[30]   Please note that this list is at present still very incomplete as only insufficient resources were available to follow up all combatant naval units involved. [back]

[31]   For details of the relief operation see Cohen 1983:38; Cunningham 1961:116ff; Hough et al. .1958:114; Heinl 1946; Morison 1948. [back]

[32]   The two carrier groups were centered on U.S.S. Lexington and on U.S.S.Enterprise and operated north and south of Task Force 14. Both fast carrier groups could have been within striking distance if the need had arisen. [back]

[33]   The amphibious attack force had left Kwajalein Atoll at 9:00 am on December 21. [back]

[34]   United States Strategic Bombing Survey, Naval Intelligence Division. Interrogation of Japanese Officials. Volume II. P. 371. quoted after Sherrod 1952:39. [back]

[35]   The meaning of this display as a diversion was apparently never realised by the Wake Garrison Commander Captain Cunningham (1961:123). [back]

[36]   Under the command of Rear Admiral A.Goto. [back]

[37]   Under the command of Rear Admiral Hiroaki Abe. [back]

[38]   The force detached from the Pearl Harbor task force comprised the following divisions and vessels: CarDiv 2, carriers Hiryu and Soryu, CruDiv 8, cruisers Tone and Chikuma and DesDiv 17, destroyers Tanakaze and Urakaze. (United States, Strategic Bombing Survey, 1946:20). [back]

[39]   The French Frigate Shoals, some 700 miles northwest of Hawaii Island, had not been used by the Japanese Fleet as a seaplane base in the 1941 carrier attack on Pearl Harbor which began the Pacific War. Having come into classified U.S.Navy Information (U.S.Naval Air Pilot) with the fall of Wake I. on 23 December 1941, however, the Japanese then decided to utilise the atoll as a rendevous point for Emily Flying boats from Jaluit and Wotje with submarines carrying fuel and bombs in a long-range bombing raid on Pearl Harbor retaliatory for the U.S. carrier raids on the Marshall Islands' and Wake bases in February 1942. (Extracted from compilation by Amerson 1971:48). Refuelling and arming of two Kawanishi H8K flying boats took place in the night of 3 March 1942 (U.S. time), which carried out a successful raid on Pearl Harbor the day after Angelucci & Matricardi 1977:179. [back]

[40]   33 members of VMF-211, 15 members from the Marine defense battalion, 3 sailors. The number of civilians killed cannot be ascertained beyond doubt, and estimates vary between 33 and 80. In addition, so Cunningham (1961:140 [footnote]; 146), between surrender an October 6, 1943 two civilians died on Wake, two died at sea while trying to escape and 98 were executed on December 7, 1943. 115 civilians died in prisoner of war camps. [back]

[41]   Source: Werstein 1964. The casualty levels reported vary widely. Junghans (n.d.16) quotes 109 Americans as killed in action, broken down as 49 marines, 13 Navy, 37 civilian contractors and 10 Pan American Employees. [back]

[42]   Cunningham 1961:91 [back]

[43]   ibid.: 139 [back]

[44]   Source: Werstein 1964. [back]

[45]   Sources: Cohen 1983; Werstein 1964. [back]

[46]   Source: Werstein 1964. [back]

[47]   Cunningham 1961:147 [back]

[48]   For the PoW experiences see Cunningham 1961; Kephardt 1950; Werstein 1964. [back]

[49]   Kephardt 1950:31; Junghans n.d. 17. On board of the Nitta Maru five Americans were executed by Japanese officers, while the whole Japanese crew looked on (Cunningham 1961:157ff). [back]

[50]   Will Miles died of septecemia (Junghans n.d. 17). [back]

[51]   Junghans n.d. 17. According to Junghans the Japanese claimed that the two had been picked up at Truk some time later and had been executed. This was considered by many to be a face-saving statement by the Japanese. [back]

[52]   Kephardt 1950:34. [back]

[53]   Junghans n.d. 17. [back]

[54]   Cunningham 1961:140 [back]

[55]   Morison 1951:136-137 [back]

[56]   Mitsubishi G3M "Sally" were seen during a raid on 15 May 1943 (IO371 1943); Mitsubishi G4M "Betty's" were seen on 24 August 1942 (HAAF 1942); Kawanishi 97 Flying boats were observed on 24 August 1942 (HAAF 1942); Kawansihi H6K boats are also visible on JICPOA 1944:Target Detail Photo Peale Island. [back]

[57]   Zeroes were observed on Wake on 23 December 1942 (Ramey 1943); 25 January 1943 (Moore 1943); 15 May 1943 (IO 371 1943 ; some of the 22 aircraft identified as Haps/Hamps, i.e. Mitsubishi A6M-22); [back]

[58]   One report of January 1943 thought that the Japanese fighter planes employed belonged to the Imperial Japanese Army rather than the Navy (Moore 1943:4), but this cannot be substantiated. [back]

[59]   Of unknown class. [back]

[60]   IO 371 1943:1. [back]

[61]   Junghans n.d. 17. [back]

[62]   Midway holds out; may yet provide nail to Jap coffin. Pacific Islands Monthly Vol. 12 (8), March 1942, page 6. - Ottori Jima - from verb ottoru = to snatch or seize in a hurry, jima = Island [back]

[63]   Cunningham 1961:146 [back]

[64]   Kephardt 1950:34. [back]

[65]   Apart from the U.S. guns captured on Wake, there were Japanese naval guns of World War I vintage, modern Japanese naval guns (for ex. the 127mm dual purpose gun), Japanese Army artillery pieces and possibly the odd gun captured elsewhere. The assortment brought with it enormous problems for maintenance and supply of spare parts, as well as training for accurate operation. It is claimed by some sources that some of the guns on Wake were originally captured in the fall of Singapore. This story is so prevalent in the Pacific region, that nothing can be made of it until the breech block numbers of the guns have been traced back to the manufacturers. [back]

[66]   After USSBS 1947b. [back]

[67]   JICPOA 1944:Target Detail Photo Heel Point. Similar structures are documented from Majuro Atoll, where they survived the war unblemished (USNA 80G-218568; 231056; 231060). [back]

[68]   See above, subsection on "The state of Wake Naval base at the outbreak of the hostilities", this chapter. [back]

[69]   Junghans n.d.:19 [back]

[70]   Crowl & Lowe 1955:210 [back]

[71]   Later Rear Admiral, in keeping with the promotion of all commissioned Japanese officers at the end of the war. The only atoll commander in the Marshalls/Gilberts area not to be promoted was Captain Masanari Shiga, IJN, atoll commander of the 66 th Keibitai station on Mile. His garrison was the first to surrender following the appeal for surrender by the Japanese emperor.

Little is so far researched on Sakaibara's background. The USSBS (1947b) states that he was born in 1895 and that at the time of surrender he had served for 30 years in the Japanese Navy. [back]

[72]   USSBS 1946a:199 [back]

[73]   After November 25 th , the 24 th Air Flotilla relieved the 22 nd . The 24 th Koku Sentai was under the command of Rear Admiral Michiguchi Yamada (Flag No. 234). [back]

[74]   Convoys originating from or heading directly for Wake appear to have been the exception, possibly caused by the imminent danger for the atolls following the increased attacks on the Marshall Islands. [back]

[75]   As is mentioned for Wotje: Kitijima 1947. [back]

[76]   Supplies found by U.S. troops after the evacuation of a Japanese base at Kiska, Alaska. Source: Verbeck 1943 [back]

[77]   The U.S. intended to use the crane for their own purposes, but despite orders to the contrary, the crane was damaged beyond repair during a raid preparatory to the U.S. landings.[back]

[78]   Moore 1943:4. [back]

[79]   Consolidated submarine areas 17 to 22. [back]

[80]   The U.S. Navy erected a submarine base on Majuro, which was operational from April 8, 1944 to the end of the war (U.S.National Archives RG 243 54 (11). [back]

[81]   USSBS 1947b; In this the situation on Wake was substantially different from that of the other by-passed garrisons where no more than at most two submarines ever came through (to Mile for example). USSBS 1947a [back]

[82]   Hashimoto 1954:262-273 [back]

[83]   Of a war-time total of 130 boats, most of which were sunk off the Japan coast. (Hasimoto 1954; Jentschura et al. 1977. [back]

[84]   The need to supply the cut-off islands was mainly pursued by the Imperial Japanese Army, while the Navy saw it as an unwanted diversion of the offensive submarines and actually had written off the numerically small by-passed garrisons (This reasoning was even argued by the atoll commander of Wotje, one of the by-passed garrisons, Yoshimi 1947:56). In an interrogation by the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey, Vice-Admiral Shigoshi Miwa (1945), Commander in Chief, 6 th (Submarine) Fleet, mentions that the sudden decrease in submarine efficiency against American shipping was equally due to U.S. radar and to the need to supply the by-passed garrisons. The disagreement between Navy and Army ended in the Army's attempt to build and operate its own submarines. [back]

[85]   USSBS 1947a:47; Oishi 1947:210; 219; 220; Tomita 1947:217; 225; Fueta 1947:232.

The common method was to tie waterproof 50kg rubber bags to the deck of the submarine (outside the hull). These bags could then be released while the submarine was submerged. Floating on the surface, the bag would be picked up by smaller craft. As a safety rule, the unloading of the submarines had to take place during the night (FAA 122, 7 September 1944, document AWM 54-962/1/2). It appears that this method of resupply was developed in early 1943 (Method of using floating rubber bags for conveying food supplies ashore. Translation of a captured Japanese document, dated 26 January 1943. ADV Intelligence Center Serial 651-43, 15 November 1943. Document AWM 54-962-1/2). [back]

[86]   A water tanker, the Goryu Maru, was beached on Aineman I., Jaluit Atoll, after damaged by mines. The vessel normally supplied Tarawa, Kiribati (and Jaluit?) with fresh water (USSBS 1947a:47; 342 photo 67; 343 photo 68). [back]

[87]   USSBS 1947b. [back]

[88]   Midway-based (and later Engebi,Enewetak) bombing raids were made by Army Air Forces B-24 of the 24 th , 26 th , 27 th , 38 th , 98th, ,301 st , 371 st , 372 nd , 392 nd , and 431 st Bombardment Groups/Squadrons, by navy PV-1 Venturas of the VPB-133 and VPB-144, by Navy PB4Y-2 Liberators and PB4Y-2 Privateers of the VPB-121 and by PBY5A-Catalinas of the VPB-23 all flying from Enewetak Atoll and Roi-Namur,Kwajalein Atoll. [back]

[89]   The following carriers are known to have taken part: U.S.S. Essex, U.S.S.Wasp, U.S.S.San Jacinto, U.S.S. Intrepid; U.S.S. Cabot; (USSBS 1947b) [back]

[90]   Surface bombardment was carried out by Task forces TF 14 (Task Groups 14.2, 14.5, 14.6,14.12 & 14.13), TF 57 and Task Group 58.6. Additional bombardment was carried out independently by U.S.S. Pennsylvania, U.S.S. New Jersey, U.S.S. Salt Lake City, U.S.S. Biloxi and several destroyers.(USSBS 1947b) [back]

[91]   Reported to have been on station were the SS Whale (Raid of 15 May 1943; IO 371 1943); [back]

[92]   Apart from the Enterprise the carrier task force consisted of the cruisers U.S.S. Northampton and U.S.S. Salt lake City and a screen of three destroyers.It was the first active combat deployment of a small "Fast carrier Group" [back]

[93]   USS Essex, USS Yorktown, USS Lexington, USS Cowpens, USS Independence, USS Bellau Wood [back]

[94]   USS Minneapolis; [back]

[95]   Morison 1951:93-95; Crowl & Lowe 1955:54. By some these losses were considered to be too high a price for an attack on a base which could be resupplied with fighter planes and defense installations. [back]

[96]   As recalled on 24 October 1943 (Morison 1951:137). [back]

[97]   Three submarines and a destroyer were used to back up the attacking planes in case of planes being shot down A photographic reconnaissance plane dispatched the following day to assess damage could not find target due to heavy weather. A renewed attempt the next day resulted in the loss of the aircraft (Ramey 1943). [back]

[98]   The runway was used for emergency landings as early as February 12, 1944, twelve days after Majuro Atoll had been taken and was fully operational by February 19th. From then onwards additional construction of taxiways and support buildings was continued. [back]

[99]   Morison 1951; Sherrod 1952 [back]

[100]   Crowl & Lowe 1955:368 [back]

[101]   Morison 1952:93. The exact extent of the shelling has not been compiled so far. [back]

[102]   Kephardt 1950:31 [back]

[103]   Cunningham 1961:140. [back]

[104]   Morison 1951:136-137. [back]

[105]   Another officer, admitting guilt and implicating both Sakaibara and Sakaibara's adjudant Lt.Cdr Soichi Tachibana, had committed suicide in prison. [back]

[106]   United States, Navy, 1946 Page 55. [back]

[107]   New York Times 6 September 1945. Page 2 [back]

[108]   New York Times July 8, 1948, pp. 5;22. [back]

[109]   Freemann 1951:362 [back]

[110]   Gooding 1972. [back]

[111]   Low tide of golf in mid-ocean.Life 37, December 13, 1954, Pages 109-110; Tidal Golf. Pacific Islands Monthly 24(5), December 1954 Page 77. [back]

[112]   Remotest Flying Club; Wake Island pilots association.Flying 55, December 1954, 36. [back]

[113]   Source Thorpe 1960:33 [back]

[114]   Source Thorpe 1960:33 [back]

[115]   May 1973 [back]

[116]   United States, House of Representatives, 1957; United States, Senate, 1957. [back]

[117]   Source: USAKA 1989. [back]

[118]   New York Times October 13, 1950, page 1; October 14, 1950, page 1; October 14, 1950, p. 3; October 15, 1950, p. 1; October 15, 1950, p. 5; October 15, 1950, p. IV 1; October 15, 1950, p. IV 8; October 15, 1950, p. IV 9; October 16, 1950, p. 1; May 1, 1951; May 16, 1951, p. 23; June 2, 1951; June 28, 1951; April 21, 1951; April 16, 1951; May 18, 1951; May 6, 1952, p. 1; December 12, 1952, p. 1. [back]

[119]   Carter 1986:498; New York Times April 26, 1975; May 2, 1975; June 9, 1975.. [back]

[120]   Attorney General's Office, 1980, Correspondence, Reports and related documents on Bikini and Kili Council delegation to Hawaii (Molokai & Hilo), Palmyra, Wake and other Marshall Islands for possible settlement. Archives of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands Microfilm No 1572, Frame 0124 ff. [back]

[121]   New York Times May 22, 1980; New York Times July 25, 1980. [back]

[122]   Wiens 1962:58 [back]

[123]   May 1973 [back]

[124]   Smith 1970:73 [back]

[125]   Smith 1970:73; emphasis mine [back]

[126]   Two of the three destroyers taking part in this raid were DD U.S.S.Maury and DD U.S.S.Balch [back]

[127]   Three submarines and a destroyer were used to back up the attacking planes in case of planes being shot down. A photographic reconnaissance plane dispatched the following day to assess damage could not find target due to heavy weather. A renewed attempt the next day resulted in the loss of the aircraft (Ramey 1943). [back]

[128]   Another source mentions the vessel as Tarasago Maru or Takasago Maru (cf. Peattie 1989:307).. [back]